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HELD, Order for a new trial for plaintiff child affirmed. Order denying plaintiff
parents a new trial reversed. In upholding the order for a new trial for the plaintiff
child, the court relied upon Von Saxe v. Barnett, 125 Wash. 639, 217 Pac. 62 (1923),
and applied the following rules: (a) under six years of age, there is a conclusive presumption that a child is incapable of contributory negligence; (b) six to fourteen,
there is a prima facie presumption against contributory negligence; (c) over fourteen,
the infant bears the burden of showing lack of capacity. As to the parents' motion for
a new trial, the court held that, as a matter of law, in the absence of knowledge of
special danger in so doing, parents are not guilty of contributory negligence in perwitting their five-year-old children to play outside without constant supervision.
Negligence-Guest Statute-Payment, What Constitutes. In Woolery v. Shearer,
153 Wash. Dec. 141, 332 P.2d 236 (1958), the plaintiff sought to recover for injuries
sustained by his wife while riding in the defendant's pickup truck. Defendant, halfbrother of the injured wife, interposed the host-guest statute. Plaintiff sought to overcome the defense by a showing that his wife was in defendant's truck returning from
a meeting where they had discussed with an attorney her appointment as guardian of
their mother. Since the guardianship would give the wife access to a bank account
and enable her to aid defendant in his business, plaintiff contended that payment had
been established and that his wife was not a guest within the meaning of the statute.
The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff, and on appeal the supreme court
reversed, holding that the mere hope of obtaining a benefit, when uncommunicated to
the passenger, does not constitute payment within the contemplation of the statute.
The unanimous departmental decision indicated no desire to extend construction of the
"payment" clause beyond the limits defined in earlier cases. The court found that
plaintiff's argument fell short of the test suggested in Fuller v. Tucker, 4 Wn.2d 426,
103 P.2d 1086 (1940), that the transportation must be motivated by the expectation
of a tangible business benefit. In answer to plaintiff's contention that an agreement
regarding the anticipated payment is not necessary, the court properly distinguished
Scholz v. Leuer, 7 Wn.2d 76, 109 P.2d 294 (1941), as being a case in which "the
anticipated payment was received during the course of the transportation."
The case illustrates the consistency of the court in literally interpreting the "payment" exception of the statute and adds to the substantial body of case law supporting
this interpretation.

WILLS AND PROBATE
Executors and Administrators-Accountability of Administratrix
for Rental Value of Residence. A solution to a troublesome problem
which had recurred in the Washington court for over half a century
was recently advanced in In re Kruse's Estate.' The question, abstractly, is whether a surving spouse, who is also administratrix, must
account to the estate for the rental value of her occupancy of the
family residence when she has no independent claim against the estate
and when she is entitled to an award in lieu of homestead of a partial
but substantial interest in the residence. The court answered that, as
a matter of basic policy, she need not.
1 152 Wash. Dec. 290, 324 P.2d 1088 (1958).
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Respondent had been married to the decedent for three years before
he died intestate in 1956. He left two sons by a former marriage,
appellants in the instant case, who contested approval of the final
accounting. Respondent was appointed administratrix and proceeded
to wind up the estate in reasonably2 approvable fashion. The court
set aside to her, as property in lieu of homestead, an undivided 78.87
per cent interest in the residence.
Appellants' controverted contention was that the court failed to
require respondent to account to the estate for the reasonable rental
value of the family residence, which she occupied during her term as
administratrix. Th court held that the administratrix did not need
to account for such rental value, especially since at all times after
decedent's death she had a right to have a substantial part of the
property set aside to her in lieu of homestead.
Since 1902 the Washington court has been confronted with a form
of this problem on several occasions, but the present case marks its
initial appearance in such shape that a direct answer was required.
Appellants relied upon three cases,2 which, on first impression, might
be thought to support their view. The court considered each of the
three and was able to distinguish them on their facts from the instant
case. As will be shown, the distinctions derived are not directly in
point.
In re Alfstad's Estate4 held that a sister was accountable as administratrix to the estate for the rental value of business property. The
property, a small-town hotel and saloon, was of a different nature from
the property in the Kruse case, as its purpose was the production of
income. Further, the administratrix in Alfstad was held accountable
for rental value as an offset to a claim she made against the estate
for expenditures for improvements to the property. She was not
entitled to an award in lieu of homestead. On those grounds the
Alfstad fact pattern is distinguishable.
As the court in the Kruse case recognizes, appellants' contention
was not before the court in In re Foster's Estate,' where a dictum
2
Appellants contested approval of a five months' extension of family allowance and
urged that a final accounting and distribution could have been made earlier. However,
since the order was not appealed from at the time made, the court held it could not
now be reviewed. The conclusion follows In re Schwarzwalter's Estate, 47 Wn.2d 119,

286 P.2d 699 (1955).

3 It re Alfstad's Estate, 27 Wash. 175, 67 Pac. 593 (1902) ; In re Foster's Estate,
139 Wash. 224, 246 Pac. 290 (1926) ; In re Hickman's Estate, 41 Wn2d 519, 250 P.2d

524 (1952).
4 27 Wash. 175, 67 Pac. 593 (1902).
6 139 Wash. 224, 246 Pac. 290 (1926).
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appeared to the effect that where the decedent owned, in his separate
right, an undivided one-half interest in a residence, the administratrix
might be accountable to contenants to the extent of offsetting any
claim she might have against the contenants, and to render an account
of rental value to the estate, if the circumstances justify.
A further distinguishing factor was found to be present in In re
Hickman's Estate,' where the surviving husband, executor under the
wife's will, was held to account for the rental value of the residence
which was the wife's separate property and which was devised to a
third party. Again the charge for rental value was made to offset a
community claim for improvements made to the property during marriage and paid for with community funds. The court chose to limit
Hickman to its facts and, manifestly, there is a variance between it and
the instant case factually.
The court's summary of the distinctions adduced was as follows:
In the instant case the property is not commercial income property,
as discussed in In re Alfstad's Estate, supra; it was not owned by
decedent as a contenant prior to death, together with other tenants in
common, as in In re Foster'sEstate, supra; it was not separate property of decedent otherwise disposed of by will, as in In re Hickman's
Estate, supra; it was not subject to a claim for improvements placed
thereon, as discussed in all three cases.7
Although discovering distinctions between the cases upon which
appellants relied and the instant case, the court did not dispose of
the crux of appellants' contention, which was simply that respondent
lived in a house which was not her property and that she ought to have
paid for the use of it. The court's answer was that she ought not to
account, but no reason was advanced in support of this conclusion
except to point out that the cases upon which appellants relied involved somewhat different facts.
Two avenues to the desired result may be suggested: (1) The award
in lieu of homestead could relate back to the death of the intestate, to
give the survivor a larger proportional interest than she would otherwise have had under the descent statute. This reasoning is purely
fictional and does unnecessary violence to the concept of title.8 (2)
6 41 Wn2d 519, 250 P.2d 524 (1952).
7 152 Wash. Dec. 290, 297, 324 P.2d 1088, 1092 (1958).

8 Under the descent statute, RCW 11.04.020, separate real property descends at
death to the surviving spouse and the children as tenants in common. Where there are
two or more children the wife receives by descent an undivided one-third interest.
The award in lieu of homestead realigns the proportionate interests of the tenants
in common. To apply a relation-back rationale would be to infer that the realignment
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Since the widow could have applied for sufficient family allowance
under RCW 11.52.040 to provide rent of this house during the probate
period, merely acting as a channel through which money was transferred from one pocket of the estate to another, the case achieves the
same result, though in a less technically correct manner.
Quite apart from the logic of the decision, the result, viewed independently, seems desirable,' insofar as the widow's ultimate undivided
interest in the property is concerned. Possibly she should still remain
accountable for the rental value during administration of the portion
she does not own. The widow-administratrix apparently acted in good
faith, and it was reasonably foreseeable that she would eventually be
awarded a substantial interest in the residence. Once the award has
been made, she is not accountable to tenants in common for rental
value of her own use, their remedy then being partition. Further, as
a practical matter the problem under examination seldom arises unless
hostility exists between the widow and the heirs."° Also, the amounts
involved are usually small. Therefore, the nonliability of the surviving spouse will not ordinarily disturb the rights of the heirs to any
appreciable degree and accords reasonably with ordinary concepts
of justice.
The value of In re Kruse's Estate is that it suggests a simplification, acceptable to the supreme court, of what could be a knotty problem when a surviving spouse lives in the family residence during
administration. The remaining question is, how large a percentage of
interest in the dwelling does the spouse have to have to use it rentfree?
STANLEY B. ALLPER
Probate-Award in Lieu of Homestead. In re White's Estate, 152 Wash. Dec.
133, 324 P.2d 262 (1958). A owned certain real property before her marriage to B.
During their marriage, B gave A a quitclaim deed to the property. The parties
separated, and A filed a declaration of homestead on her property in full compliance
with the procedure outlined in the statutes of the state. A then died intestate, and B
applied for an award in lieu of homestead under the provisions of RCW 11.52.010,
which requires as a condition precedent to the granting of such an award that it
"appear to the satisfaction of the court that no homestead has been claimed in the
manner provided by law... " The lower court denied the petition of B, because he
retroactively became superimposed upon the statute, thus denying to it any effectiveness at all.
1 Authority in other jurisdictions is sparse but consistent. A widow-admiistratrix
was not required to account where she and her husband had together bought income
property during their marriage. Foley v. Engstrom, 247 Iowa 774, 74 N.W.2d 673
(1956). But she was required to account for profits when she continued to operate
decedent's liquor store after his death. In re Ridosh's Estate, 5 A.D.2d 67, 169
N.Y.S.2d 54 (1957).
10 Note 9, supra.
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was unable to convince the court that the homestead claim previously filed by the
deceased wife was invalid. The decision was affirmed by the supreme court.
B's chances in this litigation might have been better if he had based his claim on
RCW 11.52.020 rather than RCW 11.52.010, even though some factual and statutory
construction problems might have existed under the RCW 11.52.020 approach. Under
RCW 11.52.020, the court may, if a homestead has been selected during the life time of
the deceased spouse, award such homestead to the surviving spouse. By proceeding
under RCW 11.52.010, appellant faced the necessity of showing that no valid homestead had been selected by his wife.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Horseplay-Course of Employment. The question of a workman's right to compensation for an injury sustained during a "horseplay" or "skylarking" incident was presentd to the Washington Court
for the first time in Tilly v. Department of Labor and Indus.1 Tilly,
en route to the men's lavatory, "did some act or made some remark"
to a female co-employee, and escaped into the lavatory when she
began chasing him, armed with a wet paper towel. When he later
emerged to return to his work station, she renewed the pursuit. Tilly's
efforts to regain the sanctity of the men's room were frustrated by
the intervention of a male employee, who held him while his face was
washed by his pursuer. After a brief friendly scuffle, Tiny was
released, and the two men laughingly returned to the lavatory. While
attempting to drink, Tilly lost consciousness and died the following
morning from a dissecting aneurysm.' In affirming a judgment awarding Mrs. Tilly a widow's pension, the court held that Tlly was, as a
matter of law, in the course of his employment at the time of his injury.
Although the Tilly case is one of first impression in Washington,
so-called "horseplay" incidents in workmen's compensation cases have
frequently been analyzed by courts in other states and by many text
writers.8 The non-participating victim of horseplay is generally permitted recovery,4 whereas the treatment to be given the participating
1 152 Wash. Dec. 111, 324 P.2d 432 (1958).

2 This condition apparently resulted from a reduction of the normal amount of
oxygen in the blood. The appellants, in their brief, conceded that the medical testimony
was in conflict as to the causal relation between the face washing incident and the
death. The court held this to be a concession that the jury was enttiled to find Tilly's
death to be caused by a compensable injury as defined in RCW 51.08.100. See Porter v.
Department of Labor and Indus., 51 Wn.2d 634, 320 P.2d 1099 (1958). For a discussion of what constitutes an injury under the act, see Windust v. Department of Labor
and Indus., 152 Wash. Dec. 1, 323 P.2d 241 (1958); Comment, 33 CALnr. L. REV.
458 (1945).
8 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 23 (1952); 6 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION TEXT § 1614 (Perm. ed.) ; Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under
Workinen's Compensation Laws, 41 ILL. L. Rrv. 311 (1946).
4 Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N.Y. 170, 128 N.E. 711 (1920) ; Swift &
Co. v. Forbus, 201 Okla. 516, 207 P.2d 251 (1949) ; Hollingsworth v. Auto Specialties
Mfg. Co., 352 Mich. 255, 89 N.W. 2d 431 (1958).

